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This paper uses dynamic general equilibrium models to quantitatively test the idea that
technical change caused the stock market collapse of the mid 1970’s, its subsequent stagnation,
and recovery. First, I consider the hypothesis that the arrival of information technologies
(IT) rendered old capital obsolete, and led to a collapse of equity prices. I ﬁnd that shocks
necessary for the IT-revolution to cause the observed drop in Tobin’s q imply a two-fold
increase in aggregate investment, and a strong expansion in GDP and consumption. Such
predictions are orthogonal to what one observes in the data. Next, I consider the hypothesis
that the productivity slowdown of the mid 1970’s caused an unexpected decrease in the growth
rate of shareholders’ income, causing equity prices to fall. This hypothesis is consistent with
the behavior of aggregate quantities and it delivers a large decrease in market values, but
is not capable of producing the persistently low values of q that characterize the data. My
analysis indicates that the main challenge for a general equilibrium explanation of stock
market behavior resides in reconciling the movements of Tobin’s q with those of aggregate
investment.
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The U.S. economy witnessed two important technology shocks during the mid 1970’s.
First, the growth rate of total factor productivity decreased by a factor of three around 1974
and stagnated for the following two decades [cf. Norsworthy et. al. (1979), Baily (1981),
Jorgenson (2000)]. Second, it has been argued that the mid 1970’s marked the beginning of
a new industrial revolution, associated with the introduction of information technologies [cf.
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic
(2001)]. These changes in technology coincide with some of the most dramatic, long lasting,
ﬂuctuations that the U.S. stock market has experienced. During 1973-74 the market value
of existing corporations1, shown in Figure 1 as ratio of their net capital stock2 (i.e., Tobin’s
average q), decreased by 50% and did not recover until the mid 1990’s.
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Figure 1
A growing literature suggests that there is, in fact, a causal link between these two events,
and that technological change has been the main force driving ﬂuctuations in equity prices.
1Flow of Funds, Table L213, Line 1: issues at market value plus the value of net corporate debt; net
corporate debt equals Total ﬁnancial liabilities of the corporate sector (Flow of Funds series FL104190005.Q
) minus its total ﬁnancial assets (Flow of Funds series FL104090005.Q)
2Net stock of non-residential ﬁxed assets of the corporate sector, from table 4.1 of the BEA’s ﬁxed assets
tables, plus the ﬂow of funds measure of the value of corporate inventoriesBroadly speaking, two main hypotheses have been formulated: The ﬁrst one is the “good
news” hypothesis according to which it was the arrival of information technologies that ren-
d e r e do l dc a p i t a lo b s o l e t e ,a n dc a u s e dac o l l a p s ei ni t sm a r k e tv a l u e[ e . g . G r e e n w o o da n d
Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2001)]; The sec-
ond one is the “bad news” hypothesis, according to which the slowdown of the mid 1970’s
caused an unexpected drop in the growth rate of shareholder’s income, and that is why equity
prices fell [e.g. Boldrin and Levine (2001), Hall (2001)].
The purpose of this paper is to measure the extent to which technological change can
provide us with a consistent explanation of the stock market collapse of 1974, as well as its
subsequent stagnation and recovery. A particular emphasis will be given to the study of what
Hall (2001) calls the “single hardest episode to understand” about the behavior of U.S. equity
markets: the market value of U.S. corporations was much lower than the replacement cost of
their assets, i.e. Tobin’s average q was lower than one, all over the 1974-1989 period.
The framework of analysis of this study is the one given by an intertemporal general
equilibrium theory of capital asset pricing. The rules of the exercise are simple: a model will
be considered successful if it can account for the observed movements in equity prices, and if
it is also consistent with the observed secular patterns of GDP, consumption and investment.
To evaluate the quantitative aspects of the “good news” hypothesis, I use a one-
sector neoclassical growth model where investment decisions are irreversible, and capital is
technology speciﬁc. Such assumptions allow for q to be smaller than one. Following the
literature, I consider two diﬀerent types of technology shocks: In the ﬁrst one agents learn
of the future arrival of a new, better, technology [as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) or
Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001)] and realize that existing production methods, and all of the
capital therein installed, are about to become obsolete. A calibrated version of the model
shows that information alone has no eﬀect on Tobin’s average q. Then I consider a second
type of shock which consists of the actual arrival of a new, better, technology [as in Laitner
and Stolyarov (2001)]. My numerical experiments show that, in the extreme setup where
capital is completely irreversible, and immobile across existing technologies, for equity prices
to fall as much as in the data, the model must imply a two-fold increase in investment, and
a strong and sustained expansion in GDP and consumption. All of these predictions are
2inconsistent with the U.S. experience.
For symmetry with the previous analysis, I start by evaluating the “bad news” hy-
pothesis within the framework of a one sector neoclassical growth model. I study the eﬀects
of a sudden, and unexpected, slowdown in the growth rate of total factor productivity and
ﬁnd that this theory can deliver patterns for GDP, consumption and investment compatible
with the ones in the data, but that it cannot account for the observed ﬂuctuations in Tobin’s
q. In the one sector neoclassical growth model, total output can be freely allocated among
capital and consumption and the relative price of capital is always equal to one, which makes
the model unsuitable for the study of equity price movements. To give a fair treatment to the
“bad news” hypothesis, one has to move away from a one-sector, one-capital framework. I do
so by considering a simple version of the economy described by Boldrin and Levine (2001),
which includes many types of capital, and an explicit distinction between capital and con-
sumption goods. There, an unexpected economic slowdown generates a substantial drop in
the market value of existing capital. Further analysis shows that this model cannot account
for the most prominent feature of the data: the persistently low values of q.
The paper concludes by pointing out that the main challenge for a general equilibrium
explanation of stock market behavior resides in reconciling the observed movements of Tobin’s
average q with those of aggregate investment.
2. The secular trends of the U.S. economy
As previously discussed, a theory will be considered successful if it can account for the
movements in Tobin’s average q as illustrated in Figure 1, and if it is also consistent with the
secular patterns of GDP, consumption and investment present in the data. The purpose of
this section is to provide a reasonable measure for the latter patterns.
The model economies that this paper studies are very abstract: they contain no gov-
ernment sector, no household production sector, no foreign sector, and no explicit treatment
of inventories. Consequently, the ﬁrst thing one has to consider is how to use the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to construct measures consistent with the concepts of
the theory. A summary of such a procedure, based on Cooley and Prescott (1995), follows.
The NIPA are somewhat inconsistent in that the output of some important parts of
3the capital stock are not included in measured output (GDP). The accounts include the
ﬂows of services from owner-occupied housing as part of GDP, but they do not attempt to
impute the ﬂow of services from the stock of consumer, or government, durable goods. In the
model economies considered here, output includes the output produced by all existing types
of capital and thus, to obtain a consistent measure, one has to add to the NIPA GDP the
ﬂows of services of consumer and government durables.
Regarding investment expenditures, the U.S. NIPA reports separate measures for the
private and the government sector; changes in inventories, which are another type of invest-
ment, are also independently reported. On the other hand, the NIPA treat new purchases
of durable goods as a type of consumption while, conceptually, they constitute a form of
investment. All of these investment expenditures have to be aggregated into a single measure
so as to be consistent with the simple model economies analyzed by this paper. Thus,
Aggregate investment = NIPA Private domestic investment+Net exports+Government
Investment+Inventories+New purchases of consumer and government durable goods.
In the theories here analyzed the following accounting identity will always hold
GDP = Investment+ Consumption.
When dealing with the data, and based on the previous measures of GDP and investment,
for the above equality to hold, measured consumption must be deﬁned as follows:
Consumption= NIPA’s personal consumption expenditures (other than new purchases of
durable goods)+NIPA’s Government expenditure (other than investment or durable good
purchases)+Flow of services from the stock of durable goods.
This paper concentrates on the study of the secular patterns of the stock market and therefore,
it abstracts from business cycle details. The predictions for each of the models here evaluated
should only be compared with the low frequency movements of the data. To measure those
I use the Hodrick-Prescott trend of each of the associated time series.3 The following ﬁgures
3I am using annual data, and I have used a smoothing parameter λ=10, which is within the range of values
suggested by the literature [cf. Ravn and Uhlig (2002)]
4show the results. All variables are in per capita terms and are measured in chained dollars
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5The most important features of the data are:
1. All variables display a remarkable slowdown that starts around 1965;
2. the growth rate of all variables decreases monotonically over the 1965-79 period;
3. from 1979 to 1986 the economy gradually recovers. A further slowdown starts around
1987 and culminates with the large 1991 recession;
4. ﬁnally, the mid 1990’s constitute a period of expansion. In particular, GDP experiences
a quick recovery fueled by the strongest expansion in investment of the whole sample
period.
This helps us in sharpening the deﬁnition of a successful model as one that accounts for the
patterns of Tobin’s q described by Figure 1, and that is also consistent with facts 1-4 above.
3. Good news models: The IT revolution
This section describes a general equilibrium asset pricing model with capital accumu-
lation and production, based on Brock (1980), which will be used to evaluate the quantitative
implications of the “good news” hypothesis. The model is a generalization of those developed
by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), or Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), in that agents can ac-
cumulate productive assets. Capital is assumed to be technology speciﬁc and irreversible, as
is standard in the literature [e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Sargent (1980)]. Such assump-
tions allow for the market value of installed capital to be lower than its replacement cost (so
that q can be lower than one, as in the data)4.
After describing the basic framework of analysis I give a deﬁnition of a competitive
equilibrium and, ﬁnally, the model’s measure of Tobin’s average q.
A. Households and equity markets
Preferences of the representative household are described by
4This environment is an extreme case of a world where capital can be moved, and uninstalled, at a cost.
As long as the marginal cost of uninstalling capital, or moving it, is positive, it is also true that the market
value of the ﬁrm can be lower than its replacement cost. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) consider such a






where t indexes time and c is per-capita consumption. Each household has nt units of time,
and supplies them inelastically to the labor market. The problem of the household consists
of choosing the sequences of consumption and asset holdings that maximize utility subject
to its budget constraint
∞ X
t=0
pt {ct + Vt(st+1 − st)} ≤
∞ X
t=0
pt {dtst + wtnt}
st ≥ 0,s 0 given.
Expenditures are consumption, ct, and net purchases of shares in stocks, Vt(st+1 − st); st
denotes the number of shares held at the beginning of period t, and Vt is the price per share.
Household’s income equals labor earnings, wtnt, plus total dividend income, dtst; dt denotes
dividends per-share, and wt is the wage rate.
At every given period there is one perfectly divisible equity share outstanding. Hence,
market clearing in the market for shares requires st = 1 for all t.
B. Firms and aggregate resource constraints
Firms have two diﬀerent types of capital, k1t and k2t, and hire labor to produce output
with a constant returns to scale technology. The level of technology, At, follows a deterministic
exogenous process. The problem of the ﬁrm consists of ﬁnding the sequences of investment




pt [F(k1t,k 2t,A tnt) − wtnt − x1t − x2t]
s.t.
k1t+1 = x1t +( 1− δ)k1t
k2t+1 = x2t +( 1− δ)k2t
7At+1 = γAt
x1t,x 2t ≥ 0( 1 )
given A0,k 1,0 and k2,0.
The constraints in (1) imply that investment is irreversible: newly produced goods can be
either consumed or used to augment the capital stock. But once designated as a given type
of capital they cannot be physically converted into consumption.
Finally, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint is
x1t + x2t + ct = F(k1t,k 2t,A tnt)=yt for all t
C. Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices {pt,V t} and allocations of consump-
tion, asset holdings, investment, capital, and labor {ct,s t,x 1t,x 2t,k 1t,k 2t,n t} such that
1. Given prices, {ct,s t} are a solution to the household’s problem
2. Given prices,{x1t,x 2t,k 1t,k 2t,n t} solve the problem of the ﬁrm, and
3. Markets clear, so that {ct,s t,x 1t,x 2t,k 1t,k 2t,n t} satisfy the aggregate resource constraint,
and st =1f o ra l lt.
Remark 1. In terms of period t consumption, the cost of producing a new unit of capital
equals one. Hence, the replacement cost of the ﬁrm’s capital stock, per-unit, is equal to one.
To relate the current model to the measure of Tobin’s average q in Figure 1, note that total
market capitalization, the numerator of q,e q u a l sVt; on the other hand, the replacement cost
of the stock of capital of the ﬁrm, in units of period t consumption, equals k1t + k2t.T h e
latter is the denominator of q,a n dt h u s





8The previous model abstracts from organizational capital, which gives this theory its
best chance at explaining the low market valuations of the mid 1970’s. As Hall (2000, 2001a)
points out, if one includes intangibles into the analysis then one also has to rationalize why
their value suddenly disappeared during the mid 1970’s, or, even harder, why ﬁrms chose
to accumulate assets of negative value for more than a decade. Including adjustment costs
causes the price of installed capital to be larger than one, and that is why I also excluded
them from the present analysis.
I will now use the previous simple model to obtain the quantitative implications of the
good news hypothesis.
4. Good news models: The eﬀects of “good news” on equity prices
A. The economic environment before the shock
Following Hobijn and Jovanovic, assume capital of type two is not available, so that
both, k20 and x2t are constrained to be zero, that F is homogeneous of degree one, and that
the share of total income going to labor is constant and equal to 1 − α. Any changes in this
state of aﬀairs is thought to be impossible. To simplify the analysis, and guarantee monotone
convergence to a balanced growth equilibrium, I will also assume that both, the production
and utility function satisfy the following Inada-type conditions: F and u are strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave, and limk1,t→0 F(k1,t,0,An)=∞, limk1,t→∞ F(k1,t,0,An)=0 , limc→0
u(c)=∞ and limc→∞u(c)=0 .
The following result characterizes the equilibrium behavior of Tobin’s average q under
the aforementioned assumptions




Proof. The consumer’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to st+1 and ct imply
ptVt = pt+1 (dt+1 + Vt+1). (2)
On the other hand, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to k1,t+1 delivers
9pt − µt = pt+1 [(1 − δ)+F1(k1,t+1,0,A tnt)] − µt+1(1 − δ), (3)
where µt is the multiplier of the irreversibility constraint (1). The share of total output going
to labor is 1 − α, and dividends equal
dt+1 = αF(k1,t+2,0,A t+2nt+2) − x1,t+1.
One can multiply both sides of (3) by k1,t+1 and use the homogeneity of F, the law of motion
of capital, and the above expression for dividends to get




k1,t+2 + pt+1dt+1. (4)














ptdt +( pT − µT)k1,T+1
)
(6)





It is well known that, in equilibrium, all variables converge to a balanced growth path, which is
independent of the given initial conditions [cf. Arrow and Kurz (1970), or Olson (1989)]. In a
balanced growth path investment is strictly positive and thus, by continuity, there is a τ, large
enough, such that for all t ≥ τ investment is strictly positive, and µt =0 . Hence, equations
(5), (6), the transversality condition for the problem of the ﬁrm [limT→∞pTk1,T+1 =0 ], the
one for the consumer [limT→∞pTVTsT+1 = 0], and the market clearing condition (st = 1 for
all t)i m p l yV0 =( 1− µ0)k1. Using this as initial condition for the diﬀerence equation in (7)





)k1,t+1 for all t. (8)
To prove the ﬁrst statement of the proposition note that µt is strictly positive only when
the irreversibility constraint binds; in that case, equation (8) says Vt <k t+1 =( 1− δ)kt and
the deﬁnition of q delivers qt < 1 − δ. To prove the second one assume the irreversibility
constraint does not bind, then µt =0 ,Vt = kt+1 and qt =
kt+1
kt ≥ (1 − δ). Q.E.D.
Proposition one outlines why the market value of installed capital can be lower than
its replacement cost: in a world where investment decisions are reversible if, for any reason,
agents have “too much” capital, it is possible to consume some of it, and capital returns to its
optimal level. In a world where capital is irreversible agents are prevented from recurring to
such mechanism. If there is too much capital installed in a given technology, the associated
irreversibility constraint will bind, and its price will fall below one.
B. News arrives at date zero
In an optimal growth economy, like the one considered here, agents will never over-
accumulate capital. Thus, unless the initial capital-output ratio is larger than the balanced
growth one, the irreversibility constraint will never bind, and Tobin’s q will never be lower
than one minus delta. If the production possibility frontier changes in an unexpected man-
ner, agents may ﬁnd themselves with too much capital installed in a given technology, the
irreversibility constraint may bind, and q may fall abruptly. This is the role that technology
shocks play as a source of equity price movements.
I now consider the ﬁrst type of “good news” shock. Assume that, in period t =0
agents learn that capital of type two will become available at the beginning of date T,a n d
that its arrival will raise output permanently, i.e. that for all t ≥ T
F(k1t,k 2t,A tnt) >F(k1t,0,A tnt),
for any k2t > 0. Investment in capital of type two is constrained to be zero until the new
11technology arrives (i.e. after period T). No further shocks are expected.
Hobijn and Jovanovic argue that the main reason why the price of existing capital
may fall as a result of the “good news” shock is that the new type of capital can displace
old capital as an input, and that the largest impact would occur if the arrival of new capital
made old capital fully obsolete. Following this ideas, I let
F
def = f(k1t,A 1tn1t)+f(k2t,A 2tn2t)
because it allows for the complete abandonment of old capital, and provides an upper bound
to the drop in market value the model can possibly generate. I now turn into analyzing what
happens to asset prices and aggregate quantities at date zero, the time of the shock.
C. Testing the theory
A slight modiﬁcation to the proof of proposition one, given in appendix one, can
be used to show that, for all periods prior to the actual arrival of the new technology, the
market value of existing capital can only fall below its replacement cost when the irreversibility















(1 − δ) for all t<T .
To build the best case for this theory5 assume news about the future arrival of a new, better,
technology really caused the observed stock market collapse and stagnation of the mid 1970’s.
According to the above expression for Tobin’s average q, for this to happen the irreversibility
constraint for capital of type one must bind, from the time of the shock, t =0 ,u pt op e r i o d
T. Regardless of the speciﬁc functional forms that f and u may take, the model has the
following implication for the behavior of capital:
5In appendix two I study the eﬀects of “good news” under standard functional forms for F and u;t h e
associated numerical simulations show that such shock does not have any eﬀects on Tobin’s average q. Con-
sumption for periods 0 through T can only come from the old technology, hence, in an optimum, investment
decreases, but not all the way to zero. Then, the irreversibility constraint does not bind and Tobin’s q is
unaﬀected by the shock.
12k1,t+1 =( 1− δ)
tk1,0 for t =0 ,...,T.
If good news alone caused the observed twelve-year long stagnation of q,one should see capital
falling at a 5% annual rate, which is the standard value for δ, over the 1972-84 period. This
prediction is not consistent with the U.S. experience, where capital went up by 27% - in real,
per-capita units - over the same time period.
In a world without capital accumulation, Hobijn and Jovanovic show good news can
account for the movements in the market value of U.S. corporations to GDP ratio represented
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Figure 2
. Is this also possible in a model with capital like the one analyzed here? The answer is
no. The previous argument rules out the possibility of a continuously binding irreversibility
constraint. On the other hand, if the irreversibility constraint does not bind, the market
value of the ﬁrm equals the value of its capital stock. If good news caused the observed drop
in the market value to GDP ratio one should observe a 50% drop in the ratio of corporate
capital to GDP around 1974 followed by a decade long stagnation. As can be veriﬁed by
Figure 2 above, the corporate capital to GDP ratio actually went up (by 14%), and remained
high, during the 1974-84 period.
13The analysis of this section shows that, in a model that allows for capital accumulation,
learning about the future arrival of a better technology could not have caused the 1974 stock
market collapse, nor the stagnation that followed.
5. Good news models: The arrival of a new, better, technology
Laitner and Stolyarov (2001), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), argue that the
drop in equity prices of 1974 was caused by the actual arrival of a new, better, technology.
The model of section three is now adapted to study the quantitative implications of this
hypothesis.
A. The model
To do so it is necessary to assume speciﬁc functional forms for the production and
utility functions. I pick a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation for f







and u(ct)=l n ( ct).
Before the shock, the technology using capital of type two is not available, and in-
vestment in such type of capital is constrained to be zero. The growth rate of total factor
productivity of technology one is given by
A1t+1
A1t = γ. For simplicity, the economy is assumed
to start at its balanced growth equilibrium. Agents expect these conditions to prevail forever.
B. The technology shock
In period T a new, better, technology arrives. It is better because its TFP level, and










= γ for t>T+ M
6For q to fall at the time of the shock it is necessary that the new technology is more productive than the
old one. To keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that, in the long run, both technologies can deliver the
same consumption growth rate.
14where 0 ≤ M<∞
When taking the model to the data T will be assumed to be the year of 1973.
The following result characterizes the dynamic behavior of Tobin’s average q in a very
simple way.
Proposition 2. For q to be lower than 1 − δ it is necessary that at least one of the irre-
versibility constraints bind.














where µ1t and µ2t are the multipliers of the irreversibility constraints for each type of capital.
















and note that if none of the irreversibility constraints bind both multipliers will equal zero.
The law of motion of capital implies ki,t+1 ≥ (1 − δ)ki,t for i =1 ,2, so that qt ≥ (1 − δ).
Q.E.D.
It is important to note that technological change would not have any impact on asset
prices if capital were not assumed to be technology speciﬁc. Otherwise, agents could move all
existing capital from the old technology to the new one, the irreversibility constraint would
not bind, and Tobin’s average q would not change as a result of the shock.
15C. Testing the theory
I now analyze the quantitative aspects of this theory. For it I calibrate the model so
that, in a balanced growth path7, the share of income going to capital, the investment to
capital ratio, and the capital output ratio match the corresponding 1950-72 averages of the
U.S. data. Such procedure yields
β =0 .947,λ0 =0 .4,δ =0 .05.
I pick the initial productivity level of technology two, A2,T, such that the drop in market
values matches the observed one. The growth rate of A2,t is set equal to that of the old
technology, i.e.
A2,t+1
A2,t = γ. The model is tested in an indirect way by comparing the resulting
GDP, consumption and investment series with their data counterparts.
This model cannot be analytically solved. To obtain an approximate solution I followed
Santos (1999) and set up an associated numerical model with piecewise linear interpolation,
then I computed it using the value function iteration algorithm8.T h ef o l l o w i n gﬁgures sum-
marize the results. (GDP, consumption and investment are in per capita real units, detrended
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7The one that would arise when capital of type one is the only one available
8All code was written in Fortran 77. The associated constrained optimization problems were
solved using routine DBCPOL from the IMSL math libraries. All programs can be downloaded
from the author’s web page at: www.econ.umn.edu/˜aperalta
9Under this detrending procedure a balanced growth equilibrium corresponds to a constant value for each
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17By construction, the initial drop in equity prices is equal to the one in the data. The technology
shock does not aﬀect in any way the productivity of the old technology but a new, better,
technology becomes available. Not surprisingly, GDP grows faster than trend (that is at a
rate higher than 2%) from the time of the shock, up to 1990, when it approaches its new
balanced growth level.
When the shock hits there is no capital installed in the new technology but, as it is
better than the existing one, agents have an incentive to increase their savings, in order to
enjoy higher future consumption. Those are the patterns that one observes in the above
ﬁgures. Yet, the initial value for A2T, necessary for q to fall as much as in the data, is so
big that investment doubles at the time of the shock. In the data investment did not change
much around 1973-74 and, if anything, it slightly decreased. The quantitative implications
of the model with respect to consumption are also inconsistent with the U.S. experience:
consumption did not fall as much as the previous simulations indicate - minus 25% in 197410-
. The theory also predicts a strong expansion in consumption, just two periods after the
shock, that cannot be found in the data.
In summary, shocks necessary for the model to deliver a big drop in q imply a strong
economic expansion that is not consistent with the U.S. experience. More importantly, it is
clear from the previous analysis that the better one wants the model to perform on the GDP
consumption and investment side, the worse it will do on its asset pricing implications (a
smaller drop in q would be obtained).
6. Bad news models: The productivity slowdown
One of the most prominent, “bad news,” hypothesis for explaining the stock market
collapse of 1974 is the one in Baily (1981). He argues that the abrupt increase in energy
prices of 1974 made a substantial fraction of the capital stock obsolete. The value of existing
capital decreased because it was not technologically suited to the new economic conditions.
Wei (2001) quantiﬁes this idea using a putty-clay general equilibrium model. In such an
economy ﬁrms can determine, ex-ante, the capital-energy ratio of their production processes.
Once capital is installed, the capital-energy ratio cannot be further adjusted. Her main result
10In fact, over the whole post-war period there has not been a period in which consumption falls by 25%
18is that changes in energy prices cannot account for the observed decrease in equity prices.
Speciﬁcally, she ﬁnds that an 80% increase in real energy prices causes the market value of
existing capital to fall by only 2%.
I now evaluate an alternative type of bad news shock according to which it was the
slowdown of the mid 1970’s that made stock prices go down. To understand the basic eco-
nomic forces linking economic growth to equity prices, consider the following version of Lucas









0 < β < 1,σ > 0,
ct denotes consumption at period t. Consumption is the output of the only durable good of
this economy, a tree, and grows at a constant factor η. The price of a stock in this economy11














Abstracting from changes in the stock of corporate capital, the above formula can be used
to relate the market value of the corporate sector to the growth rate of the economy, η − 1.
I take the total amount of corporate output going to capital12 as an approximation to the
ﬂows of income generated by U.S. corporations, and its average growth factor as a measure
for η.
Table 1 reports the percentage change in equity prices when the corporate sector passes,
unexpectedly, from a high growth rate, ηH (the U.S. average over the 1960-72 period), to a
11I.e., the price of a claim to the future output ﬂows generated by the tree
12Which equals gross product of corporate business minus compensation of employees (corporate). Both
in real, per-capita units.
19low one, ηL (the U.S. average over the 1973-1983 period), with
ηL =1 .02,ηH =1 .04, and β =0 .96,
σ1 . 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
Percentage change in Market value 9.35% -9.35% -18.76% -28.22% -47.29%
Table 1
If agents are not extremely risk averse, that is if σ < 1, the above “back of the envelope” cal-
culation shows that the mid 1970’s slowdown can account for a large fraction of the observed
stock market collapse. If the coeﬃcient of risk aversion σ is larger than one, then equity
prices go up as a result of a slowdown. This is a well known result in the ﬁnance literature,
and is due to the positive relation between interest rates and consumption growth imposed
by the model. An economic slowdown implies a slowdown in the ﬂows of dividends but, if
σ > 1, the interest rate falls so much that their present value actually raises.
Determining whether the previous results carry over to a dynamic general equilibrium
framework, where capital accumulation is permitted, is the main purpose of the following
sections.
In a one sector neoclassical model the economy’s growth rate is exogenously deter-
mined, by the growth rate of total factor productivity, and then seems like the natural place
to start the analysis of the previous question. I feed such model with a TFP sequence that
slows down unexpectedly, and obtain consistent predictions for the behavior of GDP, con-
sumption and investment. What the neoclassical model of optimal growth cannot account
for is the magnitude of the observed movements in Tobin’s average q.
Standard asset pricing models, like the one of Lucas (1978), abstract from changes in
capital stocks and attribute market value movements to changes in the price of capital. The
one sector neoclassical model oﬀers an extremely diﬀerent explanation for stock market ﬂuc-
tuations. In it, the relative price of capital is ﬁxed and thus, market values only change when
capital stocks do. In the U.S. data, the correlation between the market value of corporate
20equity and the net stock of corporate capital, as ratios to GDP, is highly negative over the
mid 1970’s (-0.75). Thus, such model has no hope of explaining the observed patterns in q.
In section eight, I consider a simple model which allows for the relative price of capital
to move as a result of a technology shock. I show that “bad news” imply an immediate drop
in Tobin’s average q,and an economic slowdown consistent with the U.S. data. The main
failure of this theory is that it cannot account for the most prominent feature of the data:
the persistently low values of Tobin’s average q.
7. Bad news in a one sector neoclassical model
To start the analysis of the bad news hypothesis, I use a version of the one sector
neoclassical growth model, which is a particular case of the economy of section three. The









pt {ct + Vt(st+1 − st)} ≤
∞ X
t=0
pt {dtst + wtnt}
st ≥ 0, given s0.
Assume there is only one type of capital, and that investment decisions are reversible. The









1−α − wtnt − xt
¤
s.t.
kt+1 = xt +( 1− δ)kt
At+1 = ηAt; η ≥ 1
kt ≥ 0 for all t
21Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is




A. The productivity slowdown
Assume the economy had reached its balanced growth path by the time shock hits.
The slowdown comes in period T, it is completely unexpected13, and the growth rate of total
factor productivity changes, permanently, from ηh to ηl, with ηh > ηl. By deﬁnition of a
balanced growth path, a slowdown in TFP eventually translates into a slowdown in GDP,
consumption and investment of the same proportion. Hence, this model can deliver patterns
for aggregate quantities consistent with the data. What remains to be evaluated is the eﬀect
of bad news on equity prices.
B. Eﬀects on q
As this is just a particular case of the economy of section three, proposition one can





where ηkt is the equilibrium growth factor of capital at date t. Note that, in a balanced
growth path, ηkt is equal to the growth factor of total factor productivity.
One can use the above formula to analyze what happens to q when the shock hits. In






As there are no further shocks, ηk,T goes asymptotically to its balanced growth rate ηl,a n d
the shock delivers a permanent decrease in Tobin’s q. Notice, though, that the quantitative
impact of bad news on q is very small: If the economy passes from a growth rate of 3% to
13Assuming that the technology shock is completely unexpected is just a simplifying condition. The same
type of qualitative results are obtained in a model in where TFP follows a Markov process (from the quanti-
tative point of view similar results are obtained as long as the probability of a slowdown is small).
220% right after the shock (which is much more extreme than what occurred in the U.S. during
the mid 1970’s) the implied decrease in Tobin’s q is only 3%.
C. A crucial distinction between a tree model and a model with capital accumu-
lation
Why a slowdown translates in a dramatic fall in equity prices when one uses Lucas’s
model, but not in a one sector neoclassical growth model?. In both theories a sudden drop
in the growth rate of the economy has a negative eﬀect on equity prices, because the growth
rate of dividends goes down. Yet, in a neoclassical model a slowdown also implies a decrease
in the rate of investment, which increases the fraction of total output that can be paid to
shareholders, and this pushes equity prices up. The relative price of capital is ﬁx e da ti na
one sector model, thus the two eﬀects must cancel out.
I now provide a balanced growth analysis that gives support to the previous ideas. In

















for all τ =0 ,1,2,... . Solving for xt in the law of motion for capital, and substituting its











1−α +( 1− δ)kt − kt+1
¤
Let η be the exogenously given growth rate of total factor productivity, that is
At+1
At = η. To
simplify the analysis, assume that the economy has reached its balanced growth rate and all






















































1−α +( 1− δ − η)kτ
¤ βη1−σ
1 − βη1−σ.
The term between brackets denotes the fraction of total output that shareholders expect to
receive, while the sum denotes the present value of a stream that grows at rate η.I f t h e
economy slows down unexpectedly, from a high growth rate ηH − 1t oal o wo n eηL − 1,
and one assumes σ < 1, the term in the sum, which is the only one that appears in a
“tree” model, goes down. In a model with capital accumulation, it also happens that ﬁrms
lower their investment as a result of the shock, and the fraction of total output that can be
paid to shareholders goes up. The production possibility frontier implies that capital and
consumption can be interchanged in a one to one basis. Thus, in any competitive equilibrium,
the relative price of capital is ﬁx e da to n ea n dt h et w oe ﬀects must cancel out.
For the equity prices to be aﬀected by a technology shock, it is necessary to consider
a model in which a fundamental distinction between capital and consumption goods is made,
and in which more than two types of capital goods are available. The following section
analyzes an economy with such properties.
8. Bad news in a stochastic two-sector model with many types of
capital
Consider a world with two types of commodities: a single consumption good and
an inﬁnite sequence of diﬀerent vintages of capital, indexed by i =0 ,1,... . Capital is
limited in how many generations of improvement can be sustained. Nevertheless the stage
of improvement at which a capital stock is played out and can be improved no further is not
k n o w ni na d v a n c e 14. The basic question I analyze is: what impact does the discovery that
existing capital cannot be further improved has on its value?
14The model of this section follows closely the ideas of Boldrin and Levine (2001).
24A. The state space
The state of technology, ht, follows a Markov chain characterized by: a) the set of








and c) a given initial state h0 = ηg. A state history ht =( η0,η1,...,ηt)i saﬁnite collection
of states from the ﬁrst to the current period; it is well known that the above Markov chain
induces a sequence of probability measures π(ht) on state histories via the recursion
π(h
t)=π(ht|ht−1)π(ht−1|ht−2)...π(h1|h0).
These probabilities will be useful in the determination of state contingent plans for the con-
sumer, whose behavior is analyzed below.
B. Production possibilities
There are a countable number of generations of capital i = ...,−1,0,1... . I will
denote by ki(ht) the amount of capital of generation i available at period t, following the state
history ht, and by¯ ı(ht) the highest generation of capital available at ht. Production takes place
through linear activities, each activity takes as input one unit of capital of a speciﬁcg e n e r a t i o n
and produces a single output in the following period. One unit of capital of generation i may
be used as the input into two diﬀerent activities, each of which is characterized by the output
obtained:
(1) γi units of consumption, γ > 1
(2) ρ > 1 units of the next generation of capital: generation i +1
for all i<¯ ı(ht).
The role of the technology shock is to determine whether capital of the highest gener-
ation can be upgraded or not. Thus, when i =¯ ı(ht), one unit of k¯ ı(ht) can be used into two
diﬀerent activities whose output is
25(1) γ¯ ı(ht) units of consumption for any ht ∈ H;
(2) If the state is good (ht = ηg): ρ units of the next generation of capital ¯ ı(ht)+1
If the state is bad (ht = ηb): ρ units of capital of the same generation ¯ ı(ht)
To keep the analysis simple I will assume that the initial vector of capitals, ki
0, has one unit
of capital of generation zero, and zero units of all other possible generations of capital. Given
the above production activities, and ki
0, one can see that, at any given state history ht, the
only generation of capital available for production is the highest one, ¯ ı(ht).
C. Competitive equilibrium
The problem of the household consists of ﬁnding the state-contingent consumption























st ≥ 0,s 0 given;
where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information available at date
0.V t(ht) is the price of a claim to the dividend stream, {dt(ht)}
∞
t=1 , and st+1(ht)−st denotes
net share purchases in period t.
Firms hold the stock of capital and take investment decisions in order to maximize



























t)+1i fht = ηg
i
0 = i(h





An Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of sequences of
state-contingent prices, {pt(ht),V t(ht)}
∞




1. Given prices, {st(ht),c t(ht)} solve the consumer’s problem,
2. Given prices, {xt(ht),k i
t(ht)} solve the ﬁrm’s problem and















t)+1i fht = ηg
i
0 = i(h




t) ≤ 1, for all h
t and t =0 ,1,....
It is well known, given the Markovian structure of the technology shock, the time invariant
properties of the objective functions and constraints of both, the consumer’s and the ﬁrm’s
problem, that, in a competitive equilibrium, prices and allocations will also have the Markov
property.
D. Eﬃciency of equilibria and the planner’s problem
A complete proof of the Second Welfare theorem for this type of economies can be
found in Boldrin and Levine (2001). It follows that the solutions to the planner’s problem,






















0 ≤ λ(η) ≤ 1
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium.
The above technology correspondence is a convex cone and the one period utility u is
homogeneous of degree (1−σ). Thus, the value function W is homogeneous of degree (1−σ)
with respect to k. Also, notice that having ki units of vintage i capital results in γiki times







The above facts reduce the planner’s problem from the functional equation in (11), to that






















At this point it is crucial to highlight the timing of events that the above model
implicitly assumes. In particular note that capital is produced in period t before the state in
period t is known, but is used in period t after the state is determined. Consequently, it is
possible to compare the value of capital immediately before and immediately after the state
is realized. As the following result shows, the model allows for the relative price of installed
capital to change when “bad news” arrive. At least initially, equity prices behave in the same
way as in the Lucas’ Tree model of section 6.
Proposition 3. If 0 < σ < 1, news of a negative shock causes the value of the capital stock
to fall immediately; if σ > 1 the value of the capital stock rises immediately. Moreover, for π





Proof. Since, at the beginning of period t both, the stock of capital and current consumption
are ﬁxed, the only question is what happens to the price of capital. If there is not a negative














The corresponding prices at which capital is traded are determined by diﬀerentiating these
values with respect to ki(ht). Consequently, the price of capital when the state is good is
proportional to (1 − σ)W(1,0,ηg), and when the state is bad to (1 − σ)W(1,0,ηb). It is
29clear that W(1,0,ηb) <W (1,0,ηg), hence, when 0 < σ < 1 one has (1 − σ)W(1,0,ηb) <
(1 − σ)W(1,0,ηg), and equity prices fall as a result of the bad shock, while if σ > 1t h i s
means that (1 − σ)W(1,0,ηb) > (1 − σ)W(1,0,ηg), so that equity prices go up as a result of
the bad shock. These observations prove the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
Observe that the price of capital following ηg, but before knowing what the following







On the other hand, the price of capital after learning the state has switched to ηb is just (1-
σ)γi(ht) ¡
γi(ht)ki(ht)¢−σ
W(1,0,ηb). This allows to compute the percentage change in equity



























proving the second part of the proposition. Q.E.D.
E. A numerical experiment
To get an idea of the quantitative aspects of the model, consider the following parame-
terization: The probability of the bad state is π =0 .0001, the discount factor is β =0 .98 and
ρ and γ are chosen so that the growth rate of consumption when the state is good is three
percent (which corresponds to the U.S. average over the 1950-72 period), and two percent
when the bad state comes (which corresponds to the U.S. average over the 1974-84 period).
The following table shows the percentage changes in the market value of capital as the
economy passes from the good to the bad state, as a function of the risk aversion parameter
σ
30σ 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
Percentage change in Market value 4.40% -5.84% -9.60% -14.65% -27.00%
Interest rate (good state) 7.80% 6.60% 5.60% 5.00% 3.84%
Interest rate (bad state) 6.60% 5.50% 5.00% 4.50% 3.50%
F. Tobin’s q
The previous numerical experiment shows the model is capable of generating a big
drop in equity prices as a result of an economic slowdown. The main failure of this theory is
that it cannot account for the persistency in the low values of q, which is the most prominent
feature of the data. In equilibrium, the value of q jumps to
1−λ(ηb)
1−λ(ηg) just one period after
the shock, and, two periods afterwards, it reaches its new steady state value (1 − λ(ηb)). In
the above numerical experiments, the arrival of a permanent economic slowdown implies a
permanent decrease in Tobin’s q of, at most, one per-cent.
The reason for the failure of the model is that, as in the neoclassical model of exogenous
technological progress, the market value of the representative ﬁrm is proportional to the
replacement value of its capital stock. These ideas are formalized in the following result

















So that, Tobin’s average q is determined by
q(h
t)=1− λ(h
t) for all state histories h
t.







On the other hand, if one solves for xt in (10) and substitutes this value into the objective



































Multiply both sides of (14) by k
i+1
























ﬁnally, (13), (16) and the transversality conditions for the problem of the ﬁrm, and the one

















In equilibrium the relative price of a new unit of capital of generation i equals
γi
ρ , hence, the










329. Conclusions and guidelines for further research
This study employs dynamic general equilibrium models to quantitatively test the
idea that technical change caused the stock market collapse of the mid 1970’s, its subsequent
stagnation, and recovery. First, I considered the idea that “good news,” in particular the
information technology revolution, was behind these trends. A calibrated version of the
model with technology speciﬁc capital and irreversible investment, showed that news about
the future availability of a better technology does not have any eﬀect on the price of installed
capital, and that, in general, such a hypothesis cannot deliver a consistent explanation for
the observed patterns of equity prices and aggregate capital. Then, I assessed another type
of “good news” shock, according to which the actual arrival of a better technology was the
cause of the stock market collapse of 1974, and of its subsequent recovery. In this case, the
model can make the price of old capital fall as much as in the data, but it must imply a
two-fold increase in investment, and a strong economic expansion right at the time when the
U.S. economy slowed down.
I then evaluated the hypothesis that “bad news,” speciﬁcally the economic slowdown of
the mid 1970’s, caused the observed collapse and stagnation of equity prices. The one-sector
neoclassical growth model does a good job in accounting for the movements in aggregate
quantities but forces the relative price of installed capital to equal one. To understand how
the price of capital moves as a result of technological change, one has to consider an economy
with many types of capital and must distinguish investment from consumption goods. This
study analyzes an economy with such properties, and ﬁnds an unexpected slowdown can
cause a substantial drop in market values, provided that agents are not extremely risk averse.
What this class of models cannot account for is the long stagnation in Tobin’s average q that
characterizes the data.
This analysis shows that the most important hypotheses, based on technological
change, for explaining the observed patterns of U.S. equity markets fail, either from the
quantitative point of view, the qualitative one, or both. Yet, some clear guidelines for future
research can be extracted from the very same analysis. Each existing theory captures some
feature of the U.S. data: On the one hand, a model with capital irreversibility can deliver
a large and persistent drop in Tobin’s average q, but gives counterfactual predictions for all
33aggregate quantities. On the other hand, “bad news”, in a model with many types of capital,
yields the right predictions for the behavior of GDP, consumption and investment, but fails
in accounting for the movements of q. What is needed is a model that can account, simulta-
neously, for the observed patterns of the stock market, and for those of aggregate quantities
like GDP, investment and consumption.15
My results reinforce the view that any general equilibrium theory of stock market
ﬂuctuations must “necessarily stem from a model in which ‘frictions’ are present that prevent
the price of existing capital from being driven equal at all times to the price of newly produced
capital.”16 Theory shows that for such frictions to have any equilibrium eﬀects on asset prices,
it is necessary that agents ﬁnd, suddenly, a better place to allocate all investment resources.
Therefore, some form of “good news” shock appears to be essential for the construction of a
successful model.
Finally, from the quantitative analysis in this paper, one can see that the main chal-
lenge for any general equilibrium theory of equity price movements resides in reconciling the
observed patterns of Tobin’s average q with those of aggregate investment. The lower the
values of q that one demands from the model, the better the new technology has to be, and
the larger the jump in investment that the model may deliver. Constructing credible ways
for overcoming this problem constitutes a further source of future research.
15In this sense, this paper extends a similar conclusion reached by Boldrin and Peralta-Alva (2002)
to a much broader set of general equilibrium models for capital asset pricing.
16Using the words of Sargent (1980), page 1.
34Appendix 1
Lemma 1. Under all of the assumptions outlined in section four, if news arrive at date 0







, for all t<T .
Proof. Notice that equations (3), (4) and (5) are some of the ﬁrst order conditions of the
problem of the ﬁrm, and the consumer, for all periods 0 ≤ t<T . Hence, for all t<Tone
can still get
ptVt − pt+1Vt+1 =( pt − µt)k1,t+1 − (pt+1 − µt+1)k1,t+2.
The transversality condition of the consumer does not depend on the particular time period












Relative to the situation considered by proposition one, equations (5) and (8) have to be
changed to take into account the future availability of capital of type two. Consider now all
periods in which both types of capital are available. The ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s
problem with respect to k1t+1,k 2t+1,x 1t,x 2t can be used to derive
(pt − µt)k1,t+1 +( pt − µ2t)k2,t+1 =( pt+1 − µt+1)k1,t+2 +( 1 8 )
(pt+1 − µ2t+1)k2,t+2 + pt+1dt+1,
where µ2t denotes the multiplier associated to the irreversibility constraint for capital of type
two. Using this, and the ﬁrst order condition of the consumer (3), yields
ptVt − pt+1Vt+1 =( pt − µt)k1,t+1 +( pt − µ2t)k2,t+1
− (pt+1 − µt+1)k1,t+2 − (pt+1 − µ2t+1)k2,t+2.
35Finally, using (17) one gets





pidi +( pτ − µτ)k1,τ+1 +
+( pτ − µ2τ)k2,τ+1}
which, by the transversality condition of the problem of the ﬁrm, renders

























I now consider some standard functional forms for F and u to study the eﬀects of
“good news” on equity prices, and other aggregate variables. The shock comes in period 0











1−λ0 for t ≥ T
k1t+1 = x1t +( 1− δ)k1t
k2t+1 = x2t +( 1− δ)k2t,w i t h
x2t =0i ft<T













for t ≥ T + M
with A2T ≤ A1T and A2T+M >A 1T+M.
The new technology may start with a TFP level lower than the old one, but it has M periods
over which its TFP grows faster than that of the old one; by period T + M its TFP level is
higher than that of the old one.17
In the following simulations T = 12, λ0 =0 .4a n du(c)=l n ( c). The growth rate of
A2t and its terminal level are chosen so that the maximal drop in q that the model generates
is big (in this case 40%). All data shown in the following graphs is in per capita real units
and was detrended by a 2% growing series
17To simplify the analisys I assumed that, after period T + M, the new technology’s TFP grows at the
same rate as that of the existing one. This allows to write the model in its deviations from trend form, where
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This simulations show that the reception of “good news” has no immediate eﬀects
on Tobin’s q. Investment starts decreasing right after the news are received but, as the old
technology is the only one available for producing consumption, it does not decrease all the
way to zero. In the above experiments, the irreversibility constraint becomes binding only
when the new technology is available (1983) and, as predicted by the theory, it is then that
q falls below one.
Then, at least under the functional forms considered in this experiment, learning that
the IT-revolution was on the horizon cannot explain the stock market collapse of the mid
1970’s. More importantly, the productivity level that the new technology must have (or
agents were expecting it to have) for the model to generate a large decrease in q is “too high”
to be consistent with other aggregate variables like GDP, consumption and investment.
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